Center for Behavioral Decision Research

CBDR : Seminar Series : Seminar by Daniel Houser

Does deceptive advertising reduce political participation? Theory and evidence

	presented by Daniel Houser (George Mason)


	Thursday, March 26	link to paper
	12pm
	Porter Hall 223D	link to Speaker's Site

	Abstract:

	We examine the effect of deceptive advertising on voting decisions in elections. We model two candidate elections in which 1) voters are uncertain about candidates' qualities; and 2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare political campaigns with truthful advertising to campaigns in which there is a small chance of deceptive advertising. Our theoretical model predicts that voter turnout and voter welfare are lower in campaigns with some deceptive advertising than in campaigns with completely truthful advertising. We then test our model in laboratory elections. As predicted, we find higher participation among voters in elections that allow only for truthful advertisement than in elections that permit deceptive advertising. We also document that when advertising might possibly be deceptive, voters are more likely to elect the candidate that generates less welfare.

	Host at CMU: Xiao